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THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT ALLEGED
HARASSMENT AFTER A COMPLAINT OF SEXUAL
HARASSMENT WAS MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE TO
PUNISH THE EMPLOYEE FOR COMPLAINING AND
THUS WAS NOT ACTIONABLE AS SEXUAL
HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE VII:
BERRY v. DELTA AIRLINES, INC.
CHARLES C. FLORSHEIM
T ITLE VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribes work-
place discrimination based on an employee's gender.1 This
prohibition does not extend to all hostile or harassing behavior,
but focuses only on those terms or conditions of employment
that are adversely affected because of the employee's sex.
In Berry v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,2 the Seventh Circuit examined
whether a hostile work environment motivated by an employee's
complaint of sexual harassment falls under this proscription
against sex discrimination. By correctly applying the reasoning
of established Title VII precedent, the court concluded that
post-complaint harassment is not a continued form of sex dis-
crimination when it is motivated by a desire to punish the em-
ployee for complaining, and not by an anti-female animus. The
opinion, however, fails to offer detailed substantive guidance
concerning the manner in which the employee could have es-
tablished that the post-complaint harassment was in fact moti-
vated by an anti-female animus. The court appears to hold that
where the post-complaint harassment is not overtly sexual, a
plaintiffs only recourse under Title VII is under a claim of retal-
iation, which must be alleged separately from a claim of sexual
harassment.
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2002). Employers may not "discriminate against
an individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." Id.
2 Berry v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 260 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2001).
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Under the facts of the case, the Ninth Circuit found it "likely"
that the continued harassment would not have occurred but for
the sexual harassment complaint, but that this is "too remote a
connection" to gender to convert a retaliation claim into a gen-
der-based discrimination claim.' The underlying sexual harass-
ment complaint was brought to the attention of Delta Airlines
three months before the Title VII suit was filed. Delta employed
Elise Berry as a customer service agent at its Chicago O'Hare
Airport cargo facilities.4 Herjob required her to enter the ware-
house portion of Delta's cargo building and interact with Fikret
Causevic, an employee of Argenbright Security, a company that
Delta contracted to provide baggage handling services. 5 Berry
complained to Roger Blocker, a Delta regional manager, that
Causevic had been sexually harassing her, both verbally and
physically, for over eight months.6 Blocker immediately con-
tacted Delta's Equal Opportunity Office and followed their in-
struction on how to handle the claim. After interviewing several
Delta and Argenbright employees, including Causevic, Blocker
was unable to confirm the allegation.7
Blocker did take some corrective measures. Causevic's sched-
ule was changed, significantly reducing his contact with Berry,
and both Delta and Argenbright employees were required to
watch a sexual harassment video.8 Subsequently, Berry reported
to Blocker that other employees mocked her, refused to work
with her, were rude, and uncooperative.9 This caused Berry so
much stress that she would break down and cry at work. How-
ever, Berry admitted that the sexual component of the harass-
ment stopped as soon as she made her original complaint to
Blocker.
A month after first speaking with Blocker, Berry filed a charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and re-
ceived a right to sue letter.'0 Berry thereafter filed a single-
count claim against Delta and Argenbright, alleging that they
3 Berry, 260 F.3d at 811. Title VII delineates sex discrimination and retaliation
claims. The court commented that "holding otherwise would force us to con-
clude that every claim of retaliation for filing charges of discrimination would be
a claim of discrimination." Id. at 809.
4 Id. at 804.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 803.
7 Id. at 805-06.
8 Id. at 806.
9 Id. at 807.
10 Id.
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"failed to take prompt and appropriate corrective action to rem-
edy a hostile work environment created by Causevic's sexual har-
assment."" The complaint did not state that Causevic or any
other employee had retaliated against Berry for complaining
about the harassment.12
After the court dismissed the claims against Argenbright,
Delta Airlines was granted summary judgment. 3 The district
court found no liability for the pre-complaint sexual harassment
nor any basis for the post-complaint sexual harassment. Delta
was not liable for the claimed harassment occurring prior to
Berry's initial complaint to Blocker because upon learning of
the harassment, Delta "took steps reasonably likely to prevent"
further harassment.' 4 Moreover, the district court found that all
gender-based harassment ceased after Berry first complained to
Blocker, and that the post-complaint harassment, by Berry's ad-
mission, was retaliatory. The court rejected Berry's argument
that this retaliatory harassment was a continued form of sexual
discrimination, since nothing in the record suggested that the
hostile treatment was motivated by Berry's gender. As Berry
neither alleged a claim of retaliation in her complaint nor ar-
gued that theory in opposition to Delta's summary judgment
motion, there was no issue of material fact for trial.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the holding of the
district court. 5 Writing for the court, Judge Bauer first ad-
dressed Delta's liability for the claimed harassment that oc-
curred prior to Berry's complaints to Blocker.'6 Judge Bauer
reasoned that Delta satisfied its obligations under Title VII be-
cause it neither knew nor should have known of the problem
before Berry complained, and it took prompt action reasonably
calculated to end the harassment and reasonably likely to pre-
vent it from recurring when the sexual harassment was
reported. "
Next, the court addressed the hostile workplace that occurred
after Berry complained to Blocker.' 8 The court began its analy-
sis by providing that Title VII proscribes only workplace discrim-
11 Id.
12 Id. at 808.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 804.
16 See id. at 811.
17 Id. at 813.
18 See id. at 808.
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ination on the basis of sex, race, or some other protected
status. 9 Inappropriate conduct inflicted regardless of sex is
outside the statute's ambit and an employer cannot be held lia-
ble for creating or condoning a hostile work environment unless
the hostility is motivated by one of the prosribed characteris-
tics. 20 Applying this reasoning to the facts, the court pointed
out that Berry had offered nothing suggesting that gender moti-
vated the post-complaint harassment rather than a sole desire to
punish her for her complaint.2
The court rejected Berry's argument that even though the in-
stances of post-complaint harassment were not overtly sexual,
they should be considered along with Causevic's earlier, obvi-
ously sexual actions as part of a single, ongoing gender-based
harassment campaign made possible by Delta's failure to take
prompt and appropriate corrective action in response to her
complaints. 22 Berry cited a string of cases intended to support
her argument that Title VII's coverage is broad and remedial,
embracing much more than patently obvious sexual behavior in
the workplace and that harassing conduct need not be moti-
vated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination
on the basis of sex. 23 But the court responded by pointing out
that while the cases cited by Berry correctly stressed that gender-
based harassment need not be overtly sexual and may include
ridicule, ostracism, and other forms of hostility motivated by an
anti-female animus, they do not hold that hostile behavior by co-
workers is actionable as sexual harassment if not based on gen-
der.24 Even if Delta was partly responsible for the abusive post-
complaint atmosphere by not doing enough to stop it, the court




21 Id. at 811.
22 Id. at 810.
23 See id.; see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80
(1998) ("harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex"); O'Rouke v. City of Providence,
235 F.3d 713, 729-30 (1st Cir. 2001) (ruling that "where a plaintiff endures
harassing conduct, although not explicitly sexual in nature, which undermines
her ability to succeed at a job, those acts should be considered along with overtly
sexual abusive conduct in assessing a hostile work environment claim," and that
"incidents of non-sexual conduct such as work sabotage, exclusion, denial of sup-
port, and humiliation can in context contribute to a hostile work environment").
24 Berry, 260 F.3d at 810.
25 Id.
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In concluding that incidents occurring after Berry's com-
plaints to Blocker were not actionable as sexual harassment
under Title VII, the court reasoned that while Title VII may im-
pose liability on an employer for creating or tolerating a hostile
environment motivated purely by the plaintiff's filing of a com-
plaint of sexual harassment, this is a form of retaliation, and it
must be argued as such.26 Since Berry did not plead retaliation
in her complaint, nor did she argue a theory of retaliation to the
district court in resisting Delta's motion for summary judgment,
her claims of retaliatory post-complaint harassment were
deemed irrelevant to the analysis of her sexual harassment
claim.2 v
The Berry court correctly refused to apply Berry's interpreta-
tion of Title VII cases such as Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Ser-
vices, Inc. and O'Rouke v. City of Providence, and instead properly
applied the reasoning and rules in those cases to the facts of the
dispute in holding that the actions of Delta's contractors after
Berry had complained to Blocker failed to constitute actionable
sexual harassment under Title VII. Title VII provides, in rele-
vant part, that "it shall be unlawful employment practice for an
employer... to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's race, color, sex, or national
origin. ' " The Supreme Court has held that when the work-
place is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult, sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of the victim's employment and create an abusive working envi-
ronment, Title VII is violated.29 Courts have long recognized
that sexual harassment is a "form of gender discrimination pro-
hibited by Title VII."3 Thus, the critical issue for the determina-
tion of sexual harassment claims under Title VII is whether
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment to which members of the other sex
are not exposed." Whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff
chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct
at issue actually constituted discrimination because of sex.32
26 Id.
27 Jd. at 809-10.
28 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2002).
29 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
30 Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, 145 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cir. 1998).
31 Id. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
32 Id. at 81.
2003]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Upon an initial reading of these cases, the arguments that
Berry relied upon before the court appear persuasive and appli-
cable to the instant dispute. In general, the overwhelming ma-
jority of courts examining claims under Title VII believe that
courts should avoid disaggregating a hostile work environment
claim, dividing conduct into instances of sexually oriented con-
duct and instances of unequal treatment, and then discounting
the latter category of conduct.3 3 The prevailing belief is that
such an approach of disaggregating prevents courts from con-
sidering the totality of circumstances in each case and "robs the
incidents of their cumulative effect."34 Moreover, such an ap-
proach not only ignores the reality that incidents of nonsexual
conduct-such as work sabotage, exclusion, denial of support,
and humiliation-can in context contribute to a hostile work
environment. 5 Therefore, the concern underlying this line of
cases is that an employer might escape liability, even if it knew
about certain conduct, if that conduct is isolated from a larger
pattern of acts that, as a whole, would constitute an actionable
hostile work environment.
3 6
In light of these arguments, the ultimate conclusion of the
Berry court -that the actions against Berry after her complaints
to Blocker were purely retaliatory, and not gender-based - at
first seems difficult to comprehend. Common knowledge and
experience render it unlikely that such behavior can be sepa-
rated entirely from the undeniably gender-based sexual harass-
ment that occurred prior to the complaints by Berry to Blocker.
However, a careful reading of the opinion indicates that the
court does not say that gender did not motivate these post-com-
plaint actions. Rather, the critical factor in this analysis is that
established precedent in the area of Title VII sexual harassment
provides that the plaintiff must always prove that the conduct at
issue actually constituted discrimination because of sex.3 7 In its
opinion, the Berry court pointed out that Berry had offered
nothing suggesting that the post-complaint harassment was mo-
tivated by gender rather than a sole desire to punish her for her
complaint.3 The court thus provided that although Berry was
33 See O'Rourke, 235 F.3d at 730.
34 See id. (citing Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 561 (6th Cir.
1999)); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
35 Id.
36 See id.
37 Id. at 810.
38 Id.
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likely to show that the post-complaint harassment would not
have occurred but for her complaining of sexual harassment,
this was too remote a connection to gender to itself convert the
retaliatory harassment into gender-based harassment. There-
fore, even if Delta was partly responsible for the abusive post-
complaint atmosphere by not doing enough to stop it, the court
believed that this would not alone make them liable for sexual
harassment.
In conclusion, while this opinion correctly applies the estab-
lished Title VII precedent to arrive at its holding, the court fails
to offer any guidance concerning the manner in which Berry
could have established that the post-complaint harassment was
in fact motivated by an anti-female animus. Under these facts,
where the post-complaint harassment was not overtly based on
sex, Berry appeared to make the only argument that was availa-
ble to her, one based on the cumulative effects of the harass-
ment. However, absent the presentation of evidence clearly
evincing an anti-female animus, evidence that was simply not
available to Berry, such a claim of sexual harassment apparently
cannot be maintained. Thus, this case stands for the proposi-
tion that in similar cases, where the post-complaint harassment
is not overtly sexual, a plaintiffs only recourse under Title VII is
under a claim of retaliation, which must be alleged separately
from a claim of sexual harassment.
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